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Same-Sex Divorce 
Tracy A. Thomas* 
Same-sex marriage is now legal in seventeen states and sixteen countries.1 
With this change, a question increasingly being asked is how same-sex couples 
can divorce. It is an easy answer for those who live in a marriage equality state; 
the usual divorce procedures apply. The problem arises for those who live in or 
move to a prohibition state that does not authorize same-sex marriage. As an 
article in the New York Times recently explained, “[i]n a highly mobile society, 
state bans on same-sex marriage have in many cases made untying the knot far 
harder than tying it in the first place.”2 Without the legal option to divorce, 
same-sex couples cannot remarry, suffer psychological harm from forced 
personal relationships and incur continued financial burdens from joint 
obligations like debt, insurance, and federal taxes.3 
Copyright © 2014 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their 
publications. 
*  Aileen McMurray Trusler Professor of Law, The University of Akron.  
1.  As of January 2014, the states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. The countries are Argentina, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, England/Wales, France, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay.  
2.  See Erica Goode, Ruling on Same-Sex Marriage May Help Resolve Status of Divorce, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/us/ruling-might-also-ease-the-way-for-
same-sex-divorces.html.  
3. Dahlia Lithwick & Sonja West, Texas Hold ‘Em, SLATE (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/09/texas_and_gay_marriage_will
_texas_refusal_to_grant_divorces_to_same_sex.single.html; Karen Hartman, Bound in a Gay Union 
by a State Denying It, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/ 
nyregion/bound-in-a-gay-union-by-a-state-that-didnt-recognize-it.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see 
Mary P. Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Same-Sex Divorce in a DOMA State, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 214 
(2012); Goode, supra note 2; Jesse Green, From “I Do” to “I’m Done”, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 24, 2013), 
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The legal gap between marriage and divorce exists because divorce 
jurisdiction requires the domicile of a party while marriage does not. 
“Domicile” is the state where the party resides with the intent to remain. 
Divorce jurisdiction usually requires residence for six months to one year prior 
to filing.4 A few marriage equality states—California, Delaware, the District of 
Columbia, Minnesota, and Vermont—now statutorily exempt same-sex 
marriage from the residency requirements and allow non-residents married in 
the state to return to divorce if their home state refuses to dissolve the 
marriage.5 One state, Georgia, expressly bans same-sex divorce for out-of-state 
marriages.6 In the rest of the marriage prohibition states, the only option seems 
to be that one partner permanently relocate to a marriage equality state to 
establish the domicile required to petition for divorce.7 
Courts confronted with the question of same-sex divorce have responded 
in conflicting ways. Some courts have denied divorces,8 while others have 
granted them.9 Looking closely at the reasoning of the cases suggests some 
http://nymag.com/news/features/gay-divorce-2013-3. 
4.  See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding state’s one-year residency requirement 
for divorce as permissible, but not required under due process); In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d 
869 (Iowa 1991) (recognizing a husband’s domicile as sufficient basis for divorce jurisdiction despite 
wife’s residence and place of marriage in Japan). But see Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce 
Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011) (proposing a 
change in the basis of divorce jurisdiction from the corporate-like in rem domicile rule to the usual in 
personam minimum contacts rule) . 
5.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 2320 (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 129(f) (West 2010); D.C. 
CODE § 16-902(b)(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.07 (West 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 592(b)–(c) (West 2007); see also Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33, s. 7 (Can.); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-15-115 & 14-15-116 (West 2013) (allowing divorce through a civil union statute). 
There may also be a question of proper personal jurisdiction over the non-residents necessary to 
adjudicate the incidents of divorce such as financial and custodial issues where the respondent does not 
consent to jurisdiction. See Armin U. Kuder & Marcia Kuntz, Legal Challenges of Divorce for Same-
Sex Couples, in UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 27 
(2013); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 129(f) (requiring consent to nonexclusive jurisdiction for 
divorce proceedings as a condition of same-sex marriage); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 592(b)–(c) 
(allowing non-resident same-sex divorce only if no children were born or adopted during the marriage 
and the parties agree to financial stipulations). 
6.  GA. CONST., art. I, § 4; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (West 2003). 
7.  See generally Ellen Shapiro, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: The Difficulties of Obtaining A Same-
Sex Divorce, 8 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 208 (2013); Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem of 
Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV. 73 (2011).  
8.  See, e.g., Alan Johnson, Judge Refuses Lesbians a Divorce, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 
24, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/08/24/judge-refuses-to-give-lesbians-a-
divorce.html (denying divorce in Thompson v. Roller); In re Marriage of Ranzy, No. 49D12-0903-DR-
014654 (Ind. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2009) (denying divorce for Canadian same-sex marriage); see also 
O’Darling v. O’Darling, 188 P.3d 137 (Okla. 2008) (invalidating divorce where same-sex nature was 
not disclosed to and addressed by the court). 
9.  See, e.g., Ryan Dunn, Hancock County First: A Same-Sex Divorce, COURIER (Aug. 16, 
2013), http://www.thecourier.com/Issues/2013/Aug/16/ar_news_081613_story3.asp (granting divorce 
in Mason v. Essinger); Alan Johnson, Married in New York, Local Gay Couple Gets Divorced in 
Columbus, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/ 
2012/03/23/ohio-gay-couple-receive-divorce.html (granting divorce in Baize v. Wissman); Johnson, 
supra note 8 (granting divorce in Dzhembaz v. Volkov).  
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legal options for courts in marriage prohibition states facing divorce petitions 
from same-sex couples. These options include limited recognition of the 
external marriage under conflicts of laws principles; declaring unconstitutional 
the laws that deny recognition to legal same-sex marriages or that deny same-
sex couples access to the courts; or voiding the marriage by annulment. 
I. 
LIMITED RECOGNITION OF EXTERNAL MARRIAGE 
One legal option is for courts to consider limited recognition of a same-
sex marriage solely for purposes of divorce.10 This incidental recognition 
promotes the policies behind divorce laws—disentanglement of affairs, 
personal freedom, ability to remarry, and access to the courts—but does not 
necessarily validate ongoing same-sex marriages.11 It thus arguably furthers the 
public policy of the states prohibiting same-sex marriage by terminating those 
unauthorized partnerships. 
A. Conflicts of Law 
Under the usual conflicts-of-law rule, a state will recognize out-of-state 
marriages that were valid in the state where they were performed.12 In the vast 
majority of cases, courts apply the rule of lex loci celebrationis, looking to the 
law of the location where the marriage was celebrated or contracted to 
determine its validity.13 Thus, states typically recognize easily lawful out-of-
state marriages even when they differ from the state’s own laws governing, for 
example, marital age, degrees of kinship, or common-law marriages.14 The lex 
loci rule arises from comity by which “courts will give effect to laws and 
judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation 
but out of deference and respect.”15 Accordingly, the Supreme Courts of 
Wyoming and Maryland and courts in New York have relied on comity to 
recognize lawful out-of-state same-sex marriages and grant divorces.16 
10.  See generally Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis when 
Considering Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic 
Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699 (2004). 
11.  See, e.g., Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 156 (Wy. 2011) (“[A]ccepting that a 
valid marriage exists plays no role except as a condition precedent to granting a divorce. After the 
condition precedent is met, the laws regarding divorce apply. Laws regarding marriage play no role.”). 
12.  See, e.g., Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 975–76 (Md. 2012); Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 
N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (Sup. Ct. 2008); see Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971 (1997). 
13.  See Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 156; Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public 
Policy Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does It Really Exist?, 16 QUINN. L. REV. 61 (1996). But see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971) (exception for marriage evasion). 
14.  See Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013); 
Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 504; Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio 1958) (recognizing 
lawful Massachusetts marriage between first cousins even though such kinship marriages were not 
authorized in Ohio).  
15.  Port, 44 A.3d at 975 (internal quotations omitted).  
16.  See Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 156; Port, 44 A.3d at 982; Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 504; 
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Courts might also use more generalized, commercial choice-of-law 
principles to apply the law of the state where the couple formed the marital 
contract. Under this approach, the state forum would function merely as a 
conduit for the other state’s law of marriage validity and divorce remedies of 
marital property, support, and custody.17 
Article IV of the Constitution of the United States similarly supports the 
application of conflicts of law principles, providing that states should give full 
faith and credit to the “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings” of the 
sister states.18 The clause embodies the general “wise policy” of respect for the 
official acts of another state,19 and facially seems to require that states 
recognize the lawful marriages of other states. Scholars, however, disagree as 
to whether the clause mandates interstate recognition of same-sex marriage, 
questioning whether marriage is an “act” or “record” and whether there is any 
exception to the recognition command.20 
More significantly, the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)—
enacted pursuant to the authority of the Full Faith and Credit Clause—provides 
an exemption that “[n]o State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public 
act, record, or judicial proceedings of any other State . . . respecting a 
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage.”21 
Relying on this language, one Pennsylvania court concluded that DOMA 
eliminated any requirement to recognize a Massachusetts same-sex marriage 
for purposes of divorce.22 Yet, the federal statute, by its express exception, 
implies that the constitution otherwise requires recognition of external same-
sex marriages. 
B. Public Policy Exceptions 
While broad principles of common law and federalism support 
recognition of same-sex marriages, both incorporate a public policy exception 
to that recognition. Under this exception, states will not recognize the validity 
of an out-of-state marriage where it would violate their own public policy.23 
Courts have traditionally used the public policy exception when legal marriages 
C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d. 884, 889 (Sup. Ct. 2008). But see Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 
964 (R.I. 2007) (denying divorce as state did not authorize same-sex marriage), superseded by statute, 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2013). 
17.  See Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 3, at 218; Parker v. Waronker, 918 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824–
25 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
18.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
19.  Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425–26 (1979).  
20.  Compare Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil 
Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2155 (2005) with Kramer, supra note 12, at 
1986–87.  
21.  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
22.  Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 563 (Com. Pl. Ct. 2010); see also Wilson v. Ake, 
354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303–04 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
23.  Kramer, supra note 12, at 1975–76. 
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implicate crimes like polygamy or incest.24 But importantly, “[t]he policy 
exception is necessarily narrow, lest it swallow the rule.”25 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming reconciled its own public policy against 
establishing same-sex marriage to grant a divorce of a lawful Canadian 
marriage. In Christiansen v. Christiansen the court held that recognizing a 
foreign same-sex marriage for the “limited purpose of entertaining a divorce 
proceeding does not lessen the law or policy in Wyoming against allowing the 
creation of same-sex marriages.”26 The Wyoming court emphasized that “[a] 
divorce proceeding does not involve recognition of a marriage as an ongoing 
relationship,” but merely establishes the condition precedent to granting a 
divorce.27 The court emphasized that the divorce petition did not seek to give 
effect to the marriage or establish a right to live in the state as a married couple: 
“They are not seeking to enforce any right incident to the status of being 
married. In fact, it is quite the opposite.”28 
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Port v. Cowan granted a 
divorce to a couple married lawfully out of state, distinguishing its then-
existing policy against same-sex marriage.29 The court held that limited 
recognition was not repugnant to state policy because the state did not 
criminalize same-sex marriage; rather, the state’s laws recognized and 
protected against discrimination based on sexual orientation.30 
Unlike Wyoming and Maryland, most prohibitory states have express 
language against recognizing out-of-state marriages. A few “super-DOMA” 
states like Texas and Ohio have additional language against giving effect or any 
legal benefit to same-sex marriages.31 Courts in Texas and Pennsylvania 
emphasized these restrictive prohibitions in refusing to grant same-sex 
divorces.32 For example, in In re Marriage of J.B., a Texas Court of Appeals 
found divorce to be a claim or “demand of a right” to legal benefits like 
community property rights that are “asserted as a result of a marriage.”33 Thus, 
the court held that divorce would improperly give effect to the couple’s 
marriage by presuming a valid marriage capable of divorce and by granting 
“paradigmatic legal benefit[s]” like marital property,34 violating state law that 
24.  Id. at 1970. 
25.  Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 156 (Wy. 2011). 
26.  Id. at 156. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
29.  44 A.3d 970, 975 (Md. 2012).  
30.  Id. at 979–80.  
31. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c)(2) (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 3101.01(C)(3) (2011). See Robert E. Rains, A Minimalist Approach to Same-Sex Divorce: 
Respecting States that Permit Same-Sex Divorce and States that Refuse to Recognize Them, 2012 
UTAH L. REV. 393, 420 (2012). 
32.  In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. App. 2010), review granted, 
Aug. 23, 2013; Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 562–63 (Com. Pl. Ct. 2010).  
33.  326 S.W.2d at 665.  
34.  Id. at 666.  
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prohibited “giving any effect whatsoever” to same-sex marriage. On pending 
appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, plaintiffs argue that divorce is not a marital 
benefit, but rather a residential benefit, extending the right of access to the 
courts to those who reside in the state.35 
Following this line of reasoning, states with “super-DOMA” laws might 
read narrowly the prohibition against marital legal benefits to restrict only the 
beneficial establishment of same-sex partnerships, thus permitting divorce. For 
example, Ohio treats out-of-state same-sex marriages “in all respects as having 
no legal force or effect” and prohibits granting “specific statutory benefits of a 
legal marriage” to these partnerships.36 Yet, the Ohio Supreme Court held in 
State v. Carswell that the voter intent behind this constitutional provision 
enacted by ballot initiative was to prevent the legislative or judicial creation of 
legal statuses that approximate marriage, like civil unions or domestic 
partnerships.37 Therefore, the court held, the constitutional provision did not 
preclude same-sex partners from accessing statutory benefits of marriage like 
the domestic violence protection.38 Similarly, the divorce statute, like the 
domestic violence statute, may not be precluded by the constitutional provision 




A state’s assertion of the public policy exception to deny recognition of 
same-sex marriage for divorce must still comport with the Constitution.40 The 
exception cannot be used to accomplish unconstitutional objectives, as the 
Supreme Court held in the inter-racial marriage case of Loving v. Virginia.41 
Legal scholars have concluded that denying same-sex divorce violates equal 
protection and due process because there is “no legitimate reason to keep 
acrimonious couples married,” especially in a time where all fifty states permit 
no fault divorce.42 The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Windsor bolsters this conclusion in striking down the provision of DOMA 
denying recognition to valid state same-sex marriages. 
 
35.  See Lithwick & West, supra note 3. The companion case in the Texas appeal did uphold 
the same-sex divorce granted by the trial court, finding that the state had no standing to intervene in the 
private matter. State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App. 2011), review granted, Aug. 23, 2013. 
36.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(2)–(3) (West 2011).  
37.  871 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ohio 2007). 
38.  Id. at 554. 
39.  See Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 16–
26 (2012).  
40.  Kramer, supra note 12, at 1971. 
41.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
42.  E.g., Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 39, at 25; Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 3, at 215; 
Oppenheimer, supra note 7, at 108-110. 
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A Texas trial court in In re Marriage of J.B. agreed that a denial of same-
sex divorce violated equal protection, but was reversed on appeal.43 The Texas 
Court of Appeals held that the legitimate state interest in “promoting the raising 
of children in the optimal familial setting” justified under rational basis the 
classification granting the right to divorce only to opposite-sex couples and not 
to same-sex couples.44 The court held that the persons classified were 
distinguished by the relevant characteristic of their “natural ability to procreate” 
based on the state’s legitimate interest in “fostering relationships that will serve 
children best.”45 On pending appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the 
petitioners challenge that “the court of appeals never connects the dots” to 
show a rational relation, questioning how denying same-sex couples access to 
divorce promotes the optimization of marriage, procreation, and the raising of 
children in opposite-sex households.46 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor concludes more emphatically 
that non-recognition of valid same-sex marriages is unconstitutional, finding 
only animus against same-sex couples behind the pretext of optimal family 
life.47 The majority framed the problem with DOMA as discrimination in the 
government’s recognition of all lawful state marriages, except same-sex 
marriages.48 The government, the Court held, expressly targeted a class of 
marriages some states had intended to protect. The Court concluded that no 
rational state interest justified this denial, as the legislative intent simply 
disapproved of homosexuals, stigmatized gay marriages, and created a 
preference for heterosexual marriages.49 
Relying on Windsor, an Ohio federal court in Obergefell v. Kasich 
recognized the validity of a lawful out-of-state same-sex marriage for purposes 
of identification on a death certificate.50 The court framed the issue as Ohio’s 
usual practice of recognizing the validity of lawful out-of-state marriages under 
lex loci versus its differing treatment of denial of same-sex marriages.51 It 
concluded that “this [wa]s not a complicated case” and Windsor supported the 
conclusion that the targeting of same-sex partners of lawful marriages lacked 
basis in any rational state interest, but rather arose from animus and disapproval 
of homosexuality in violation of equal protection.52 The court, in a related 
43.  In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010). 
44.  Id. at 677. 
45.  Id. at 674; see Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 575–76 (Com. Pl. Ct. 2010). 
46.  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 26, In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., No. 11-0024 (Tex. 
Sept. 6, 2011), 2011 WL 8584393, at *26.  
47.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see Goode, supra note 2.  
48.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
49.  Id. at 2695–96; see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
50.  No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) (granting temporary 
restraining order). The plaintiff, John Arthur, died three months later. Tim Swift, Gay Ohio Man Who 
Sparked a Legal Case Dies, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/10/23/gay-ohio-marriage-case-death_n_4147659.html 
51.  Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262 at *5. 
52.  Id. at *1. 
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decision on the merits, articulated the constitutional implications of the usual 
deference to out-of-state marriages, explaining that “once you get married 
lawfully in one state, another state cannot summarily take your marriage away, 
because the right to remain married is properly recognized as a fundamental 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.”53 
The differential treatment of same-sex couples with respect to divorce 
might also be framed as an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts.54 
Individuals cannot divorce themselves through private agreement, and thus 
require access to the courts. This state monopoly over divorce led the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut to find that a categorical denial of 
access to the courts for one group of people violated due process.55 In striking 
down a categorical denial of divorce for indigent plaintiffs, the Court 
emphasized the special nature of divorce as “a right of substantial magnitude” 
that embodied access to the courts, the ability to escape constraints and legal 
obligations, and the denial of the fundamental right to remarry.56 By 
distinguishing divorce from marriage, petitioners seeking same-sex divorce can 
draw on the right of access to the courts and Windsor57 to conclude that no 
basis other than animus exists for denying divorce when no-fault divorce is 
otherwise available in all states.58 
III. 
VOIDING THE MARRIAGE 
Parties to a same-sex marriage may alternatively seek to void or annul the 
marriage. Courts in marriage prohibition states like Arizona, Texas, and 
Pennsylvania have endorsed this option as a viable way to harmonize the 




53.  Obergefell v. Wymyslo, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013Wl 6726688, at*1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 
2013). 
54.  Meg Penrose, Unbreakable Vows: Same-Sex Marriage and the Fundamental Right to 
Divorce, 58 VILL. L. REV. 169, 203 (2013); Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 39, at 33-36; Oppenheimer, 
supra note 7, at 110; L. Lynn Hogue, The Constitutional Obligation to Adjudicate Petitions for Same-
Sex Divorce and the Dissolution of Civil Unions and Analogous Same-Sex Relationships: 
Prolegomenon to a Brief, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 229, 229–30 (2010). 
55.  401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971); see Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 39, at 33–36; Byrn & 
Holcomb, supra note 3, at 215. 
56.  Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380–81 & n.8. 
57.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
58.  Hogue, supra note 54, at 229. 
59.  E.g., Atwood v. Riviotta, No. 1CA-CV 12-0280, 2013 WL 2150021, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
May 16, 2013); Surnamer v. Ellstrom, No. 1CA-CV 11-0504, 2012 WL 2864412, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. July 12, 2012); In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 667, 678–79 (Tex. App. 2010); 
Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 576 (Com. Pl. Ct. 2010).  
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In marriage prohibition states, laws and constitutional provisions deem 
same-sex marriages void ab initio or invalid from their inception.60 Voidance 
by its nature does not recognize the validity of the marriage, but instead is 
“based on the premise that the marriage is void” from the start.61 This 
theoretical distinction allows the courts to reconcile their state DOMAs because 
voidance does not “recognize or effectuate a marriage” yet facilitates the same-
sex parties’ primary objectives of disentangling their personal and economic 
affairs.62 
Annulment is the usual process for obtaining a judicial declaration voiding 
a marriage.63 However, annulment actions suffer from some potential 
limitations. First, availability of annulment can be limited by short statute of 
limitations periods after the celebration of the marriage or discovery of the 
defect.64 Second, annulment actions may not offer the usual range of marital 
remedies like property division and spousal support that same-sex couples may 
seek.65 Some states have equitable savings clauses that extend such remedies in 
annulment by analogy.66 Alternatively, a court might resolve financial issues 
using contract principles to enforce an express separation agreement or use 
equitable principles of implied contract or unjust enrichment.67 
Third, a declaration of voidness might not be respected in marriage 
equality states as terminating the marriage.68 A Virginia court considering the 
analogous issue of dissolving a civil union in a non-recognition state thought its 
decision would not be binding in the originating state.69 Yet, the Texas court in 
In re Marriage of J.B. dismissed this extraterritorial concern, stating simply that 
a declaration of voidness should be effective in other jurisdictions.70 As 
previously discussed, judicial decrees generally receive the highest degree of 
interstate recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but only if 
DOMA does not provide an exception.71 Thus, uncertainty surrounds the 
60. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(b) (West 2013) (“void in this state”); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(1) (West 2011) (“void ab initio and shall not be recognized by this state”). 
61.  Atwood, 2013 WL 2150021, at *1; see also Surnamer, 2012 WL 2864412, at *2. 
62.  In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 667; see Hartman, supra note 3. 
63.  E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.31 & 3105.32; HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 136–38 (2d. ed. 1988). 
64.  E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.32 (two-year limitation for minors and fraud). 
65.  E.g., Liming v. Liming, 691 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); In re Marriage of 
J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 679. 
66.  See Liming, 691 N.E.2d at 301; Atwood, 2013 WL 2150021, at *1; Surnamer, 2012 WL 
2864412, at*2; In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 667; CLARK, supra note 63, at 138–40; see also 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES FOR THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.03, 6.05 (2002). 
67.  E.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122–23 (Cal. 1976); Gonzales v. Green, 831 
N.Y.S.2d 856, 859 (Sup. Ct. 2006); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(3)(b) (dictating that the 
state’s DOMA will not “[a]ffect the validity of private agreements that are otherwise valid under the 
laws of th[e] state”). 
68.  See Rains, supra note 31, at 414. 
69.  Austin v. Austin, 75 Va. Cir. 240, 243 (2008).  
70.  In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 667. 
71.  See supra Part I.B. 
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finality and effect of an annulment decree in a marriage equality state, and 
states may even subject a party to liability for polygamy after remarriage, 
should the state not recognize the annulment.72 
Finally, petitioners have also resisted the option of voiding the marriage as 
a second-class alternative. They argue that voidance symbolically stigmatizes 
their prior marriage by placing them in the “odious company” of unions 
traditionally deemed illegitimate and criminal, like incestuous and polygamous 
marriages, even though the Supreme Court has explicitly held the 
criminalization of homosexual behavior to be unconstitutional.73 
CONCLUSION 
Courts thus have several possible avenues for addressing petitions for 
same-sex divorce in the absence of state authorization of same-sex marriage. 
They might apply the law of the state of marriage celebration to acknowledge 
the validity of that out-of-state marriage for the limited purpose of granting the 
divorce. Principles of comity, lex loci, or full faith and credit support this 
general approach with the secondary determination that the public policy 
exception against establishing same-sex marriage is not implicated by the 
limited recognition for termination. Courts relying on public policy against 
same-sex marriage to prohibit the divorce must go further to evaluate the 
constitutionality of that policy under equal protection and due process both for 
discrimination in light of Windsor and for denial of access to the courts. 
Alternatively, courts might process the case as an annulment to declare the 
marriage void. Property, support, and custody issues would then be resolved by 
designated statute where available, analogous equitable principles, or principles 
of contract law. Given these available legal options, courts can no longer 
simply dismiss the same-sex divorce action outright, but instead, must give full 
legal consideration to the issue. 
72.  See Elia-Warnken v. Elia, 972 N.E.2d 17, 21–22 (Mass. 2012). 
73.  See In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 679–80 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578–79 (2003)). 
 
